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Although this paper deals principally with One, considering the conclusions it 
draws, it will by no means be restricted to One.1 No matter how primarily it fo-
cuses on showing that the theme One in Lacanian thought is confined to one-
sidedness, the crucial consequences of Lacan’s leaving this aspect ‘incomplete’ 
will be highlighted. In brief, the following arguments will be addressed through-
out the paper: 
Lacan’s understanding of One is one-sided, and it elaborates the reality of 1. 
One from one aspect only; thus, the incomplete aspects of this reality should 
also be elucidated. 
Comprehending the aspect that has been left incomplete is possible through 2. 
a representation of it, but one that does not involve the concept of One. 
One such representation opens up varied opportunities to think. 3. 
In addition, the representation’s significance is that it qualifies as a repre-4. 
sentation that explains the disjunction – as well as ‘one’ness – in language 
and thought.
 
The above-mentioned arguments will be developed in three sections. In the first 
section, Lacan’s reflection on One will be dealt with in a detailed way. The sec-
ond section traces the consequences of Lacan’s thought – as described in the 
first section. The third section presents our position and theses based thereon.   
*
1 Indeed for quite some time – that is, since I started to contemplate Two – I have definitely 
wished for Two to appear in the title of this article. However, whenever I set myself to write 
about Two, I was inclined to have ‘One’ in the title, thereby clearly feeling the need to discuss 
One at some length.
* Ankara University, Philosophy Department.
Yücel Dursun*
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I. Lacan and One
Imagine that you are a primary school pupil, and you are just learning to count. 
You have started to identify objects quite recently, and your teacher is trying to 
teach you to count using these objects. Take a second and try to imagine what 
your teacher might be doing in this situation. We can assume that the teacher, 
for this purpose, points at an object – probably something in the immediate 
classroom environment, such as a table, chair, pencil, or eraser – and says to 
you, “one desk, one chair,…” or does this by putting the symbol ‘|’ on the black 
board. We can then assume that the teacher points at the desks (or chairs, etc.) 
in a row, calling each one of them: “two desks, two chairs,…” and turns again 
to the blackboard to make another ‘|’ symbol. Thereupon, she points at all the 
‘|’s on the board and writes or says “two”. It is not difficult to imagine that the 
teacher would keep doing this to teach you to count to, say, ten.  
To understand One, Lacan gives quite a similar example. Let us focus on this 
scenario: When contemplating One and – in general, identification – what is 
important for Lacan in this example is that ‘|’, which shows ‘1 desk’, ‘1 chair’, 
should be understood. More importantly, the moment at which such a symbol 
originates or emerges should be focused on (Lacan, 1961–1962: 6 December 
1961). Thus, Lacan’s intention is to show the relationship between the rigor (la 
rigueur) of the sign and 1 (Lacan, 1961–1962: 29 November 1961). At this point, 
the term ‘la rigueur’ is used on purpose because this term draws attention to the 
fact that when we have a closer look at the sequence 1, 2, 3, 4, ...7 – so easy for us 
at first sight – we realize that it has, in fact, a porous structure. There is a tight-
ly woven structure, and its porosity had always been there well before sign ‘|’ 
was positioned. In other words, if we were to review the process in slow-motion 
mode, we would be able to perceive that, when counting, “two and three do not 
come rather quickly” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 7 March 1962). This statement signals 
that a counting process, started well before the counting we do daily and which 
entails an ordinary counting act, has readily been in play. We need to go back to 
our teacher and her or his operation on the blackboard to further elaborate on 
this. Lacan, at this very point, scrutinized the emergence of the mark ‘|’ to use 
a concept borrowed from Freud – This concept is called einziger Zug, i.e. trait 
unique and Lacan perfectly describes the unique feature of the sign. 
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Trait Unique (einziger Zug) and Unary Trait (trait unaire) 
Lacan indicates that this term, coined by Freud, is not a new term: in set theory 
in the field of mathematics, unaire is used in place of einziger/unique and serves 
the same purpose (Lacan, 1961–1962: 6 December 1961): to investigate the trait 
that creates the identification, or the oneness, of the sign ‘|’ as a significant; that 
is, to study what was mentioned above as tight. The unary trait will help per-
ceive not only the emergence of the sign ‘|’ as a signifier, but also the counting 
‘process’ of the unary trait, which is the foundation of any signifier – and which 
constitutes the essence of the signifier (Lacan, 1961–1962: 6 December 1961) ac-
cording to Lacan. At the same time, the process of the unary trait, “brings its 
effect to bear on the most radical characters of what is called Thinking” (Lacan, 
1961–1962: 7 March 1962).
To return to our case, it can be said that what arises before us in understand-
ing the emergence of sign ‘|’ is, above anything else, the unity, or one-ness of 
the sign. However, how do we make this decision? Or, stated differently, where 
does this originate? It is not a simple question; to be able to explain how the 
unary trait of the symbol has become possible, we need to imagine another 
scenario. The scenario is about the hunting experience of a man living in pre-
historic times. 
Here Lacan asks us to imagine the primitive hunter making a stroke on an ani-
mal rib-bone for each animal he has hunted. The primitive hunter hunts, and 
he makes one stroke for every hunting experience of his. He wants to remember 
his next hunting experience by making another stroke. In a sense, he achieves a 
reproduction of his adventures.
Examining the case, we have two options: The first is the analysis of the appear-
ance of the first (and the following) strokes. The second, so closely related to the 
first that they almost overlap, is analyzed simultaneously: This is about count-
ing as these strokes appear. That is, this entails elaborating on what kind of a 
counting process the primitive hunter carries out. 
Let us take a closer look at the first circumstance in the primitive hunter scenar-
io. Lacan first explains the unary trait that exists in the emergence of the stroke 
(and in the counting process that naturally occurs) by its qualitative difference. 
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He wants to clarify what the possibility of a gap – that is, the space between the 
first stroke and the next – in fact, means. He maintains: 
What I mean, on the contrary, is that here we see arising something which I am not 
saying is the first appearance, but in any case a certain appearance of something 
which you see is altogether distinguished from what can be designated as a qualita-
tive difference: Each one of these traits is not at all identical to its neighbor, but it is 
not because they are different that they function as different, but because the signify-
ing difference is distinct from anything that refers to qualitative difference (Lacan, 
1961–1962: 6 December 1961)    
 
Lacan first focuses on the qualitative difference of each appearance before he 
understands how the first appearance occurred. And it is in this context that he 
discusses the unicity of the unary trait, which forms the basis of the qualitative 
difference and the qualitative difference that is derived from ‘signifying differ-
ence’. At the basis of every qualitative difference lies a feature that is unique to 
the unary trait. In fact, it is this feature that makes the sign one and only, dis-
tinct from the others.2 A more fundamental and radical difference provides the 
basis for the unary trait. It is so fundamental that it is already in existence when 
the first stroke appears; any character appears to be different from another at 
the very moment it comes into being, and it entails neither variety nor variation 
(Lacan, 1961–1962: 6 December 1961). In this sense, the unary trait should be 
taken as being related to an extreme reduction of all occasions that bring about 
qualitative difference (Lacan, 1961–1962: 6 December 1961). It is just like appreci-
ating the unicity of a knitting pattern of a piece on cloth rather than the pieces of 
fluff on it, or its colour or design. Therefore, the sole property of the unary trait 
is expressed by its unicity (Chiesa, 2006: 75).
On the other hand, qualitative difference can also be perceived through ‘signify-
ing sameness’. The sameness in question is “constituted precisely by the fact 
that the signifier as such serves to connote difference in the pure state” (Lacan, 
1961–1962: 6 December 1961). In other words, sameness (la mêmeté) is a result of 
difference alone. Signifying difference reveals sameness each time. 
2 That is why Lacan does not believe in tautology (i.e. A implies A) (Lacan 1961–1962).
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To get back to the hunter case to clarify this point, Lacan makes the following 
comment: “I am a hunter […] I kill one of them [animals]. It is an adventure. I 
kill another of them, it is a second adventure which I can distinguish by certain 
traits from the first, but which resembles it essentially by being marked with the 
same general line” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 6 December 1961). Taking closer look at 
the case in which the hunter makes strokes for his adventures, what can we say 
about the appearance of the first stroke? Where did this first stroke come from? 
Just like a child unaware of the notion of ‘counting’, the hunter makes a stroke 
symbolically representing his first experience, which he has first imagined and 
distinguished from his second experience intuitively (Chiesa, 2006: 76). In other 
words, what he really does is to make a stroke for the ‘same general line’ con-
necting the two adventures to each other, and this is in fact the ‘difference’ be-
tween the intuitively retrieved experiences of the hunter, who is unaware of the 
notion of counting. Thus, separation and difference, which combine them along 
the same line is shown by a single stroke. Unaware of the counting notion as he 
is, by way of making the first stroke, the primitive hunter has counted his first 
experience as 1. Starting from the very first stroke, this basic difference inher-
ently continues through the coming strokes. Although the difference that inher-
ently exists in strokes will soon be overshadowed by every single stroke that is 
made, this basic difference will reappear after a while as the previous condition 
will be repeated in another form.3 This, in a way, explains why it is inherent in 
counting. We will later return to the ‘primitive hunter’ example, which has a key 
role in Lacan’s reasoning of One. 
It is worth noting two issues at this point. First, as one can see, there was a set-
ting conducive to counting before the primitive hunter starts to count number 1. 
The fact that the primitive hunter first distinguishes his experience from other 
experiences before he counts his experience with a stroke is the background 
to this setting. The condition that makes distinction possible is what initiated 
counting long before. That is, distinguishing the first experience lays forward 
the distinctiveness of the other and, due to this, its difference. However, it is this 
different-from characteristic that will initiate counting. That is, the first stroke 
having been made, that difference will be marked. The following strokes will be 
made to mark difference/s in the same manner.  To better grasp this argument, 
3 Because ability to discriminate between the strokes is at stake and ‘counting’ will also be 
required for them.
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one needs to avoid the fallacy that the hunter made those strokes because of the 
similarity among his experiences. As a matter of fact, what brings the strokes 
together is not a similarity, as such, but the very basic ‘different-from’ thing. 
As, one can see, the characteristic that makes us count as one, that is, the unary 
trait (traite unaire) is the difference. Nevertheless, according to Lacan, this dif-
ference “which not alone supports, but which supposes the subsistence along-
side it of one plus one and one again (suppose la subsistance à côté de lui de un 
plus un et encore un), the plus being only meant there to mark well the radical 
subsistence of this difference” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 7 March 1962). Therefore, the 
subsistence of the difference, also supporting the qualitative differences, is not 
one that can be considered alone. What we call difference supposes others that 
are in the immediate vicinity and that are subject to the difference. In addition, 
as with the primitive hunter, the result of counting is only for the difference. As 
a result of this, 1, marking the first experience of the primitive hunter, follows 
a counting act that has already started. To summarize, we would show one of 
those that are in the immediate vicinity of the difference as one, and another as 
one, and the result as one. And the difference would remain both basic and radi-
cal. The difference would have brought the others around itself adding them up 
(‘plus’), and the difference itself would have remained. Hence, the stroke of the 
primitive hunter would have marked the difference itself (that is, as a ‘plus’).  
At this point, we see that the primary characteristic of the unary trait that makes 
us count as 1 – the first stroke of the hunter – is derived from a fundamental 
difference. This same basic difference is the very thing creating the unicity of 
the unary trait and revealing its unity function. Lacan utilizes Euclides’ monas 
(unit) definition to better explain where, in this sense, the real thing rendering 
the signifier its unity comes from. As long as the unary trait (trait unaire) is taken 
as difference as support, it fits Euclides’ definition of monas. According to Eu-
clides’ definition, Lacan defines monas as a concept “through which something 
is distinguished from what surrounds it”, and monas is “the factor that makes 
a whole, or a One in the unitary sense of the function” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 13 
December 1961). 
The function of difference that cannot vanish or be reduced is therefore to give 
anything its ‘one’ness. We also see that the same difference – owing to its redu-
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cable self (‘plus’) – gives anything its unicity and singularity. If then becomes 
clearer why Lacan uses the term ‘rigor’ (la rigueur) for the signifier.                 
At this point we have to look at the radical difference in question more closely: 
To understand the counting that starts before 1 and the situation of the unitary 
function at the very beginning, we need to return to Lacan’s reflections on this 
issue and study them more extensively. 
Lack, Privation, and Exclusion
The concept of difference in Lacanian literature is associated directly with the 
concepts of lack and privation. In this literature, true comprehension of lack 
and privation is closely related to the contexts in which they are used. When ap-
proached from this angle, no matter how similar the meanings ‘lack’ and ‘being 
deprived’ seem to conjure up, the most important difference between the two is 
expressed by Lacan as follows: “Lack is only graspable through mediation of 
symbolic”, and the other one is “something real” (Lacan, 1962–1963: 30 January 
1963).  Although there is not much point in delving deeper into Lacan’s concepts 
of the symbolic and real, his following example is still worth mentioning: “As I 
told you, privation is something real. It is clear that a woman does not have a pe-
nis. But if you do not symbolize the penis as the essential element to have or not 
to have, she will know nothing of this privation. Lack for its part is symbolic” 
(Lacan, 1962–1963: 30 January 1963). Such definition of lack is complemented by 
an ascertainment that lack, in fact, is ‘radical’ (Lacan, 1962–1963: 30 Jannuary 
1963). At this point, Lacan believes that this lack being radical can be explained 
best by the concept of privation. Now we need to start the discussion of ‘unary 
trait’ from where we left off to better describe Lacan’s belief that lack is radical.  
We have seen that what supports the unicity of the unary trait (traite unaire) was 
a fundamental difference. In a way, Lacan has likened this to Euclides’ monas 
to explain that this characteristic again plays a key role in the emergence of the 
signifier’s unity (unité). However, what Lacan aims to communicate by using 
this term is not that the unary traits come together to form a unity. In the proc-
lamation that totality and unity form solidarity, the aim is not to say that there 
is an inclusion relation that involves totality and unity in itself. What is meant 
here is not that being total is according to units. Rather, unit is not the primary 
thing that is the basis of the unity of the total; on the contrary, it is whatever is 
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meant by the fact that unity is the unity of a whole (l'unité d'un tout) (Lacan, 
1961–1962: 7 March 1962).
Because of this, Lacan long criticized ‘inclusion’ and ‘inclusion/exclusion op-
position’, which he always saw as a source of misunderstanding that has caused 
so many unsolved problems in the rationale of class. Lacan maintains that the 
real essence of class lies neither in its intension nor extension, but that it always 
supposes classification (Lacan, 1961–1962: 7 March 62). At this point, Lacan asks 
us to behold the exclusion that is inherent in the very structure of the class and 
which, in a way, is a “radical support” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 7 March 1962). 
But, what does ‘exclusion’ mean as a ‘radical support’? I believe that under-
standing this point in Lacanian thought plays a key role in understanding – on 
the most basic level – his reflection on One and, in general, his whole doctrine. 
After all, according to Lacan, even existing basically hinges on an exclusion 
relationship (e.g. ex-sistere) (Lacan, 1971–1972: 15 March 1972). Indeed, Lacan 
traces this relation far back to logical operators such as ‘some, at least one’ (∃x), 
‘whole’ (∀x).
It is helpful to scrutinize Lacan’s examples to understand what exclusion rela-
tion means. Although these examples show the same classification logic as in 
‘mammals’ and ‘vertebrates’, they are closely related to the issue we mention 
above. They are particularly related to the counting that previously started and 
that allows for the count as 1. As mentioned earlier, the thing that made the 
primitive hunter make the first stroke and count it as one is derived from a basic 
difference. The primitive hunter used to make one stroke for the difference. That 
is, the unary trait that makes the stroke count as one was the ‘difference’. The 
difference in question now can be expressed in terms of the lack of the stroke. 
The unary trait can be its ‘lacking’ as it can be counted as one; that is, it pro-
duces one stroke. Thus, it can be said that the counting of the one that ‘lacks’ 
appears as one stroke. 
Lacan claims that the unary trait can be ‘lacking’ (manquer), and he exemplifies 
this, using mammals: Zoology mammals cannot be classified based solely on the 
materiality of the mamma. The reason for this is that it has to first distinguish, 
or separate, the mamma; such distinction is possible through the definition of 
the lack of the mamma. Lacan introduces the unary trait whereby the zoologist 
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can define the lack of a mamma as -1. The case in which the mamma cannot 
cease to exist is (-1); that is, the exclusion of the previous one. In its particular 
proposition, in other words in the case of some mamma existing, the unary trait 
is +1. Hence, mammae never existing and their existing in the universal and 
particular sense are classified. Lacan demonstrates these using a circle chart di-
vided into fourths. The bottom right quadrant displays the non-existence of the 
mamma and thus is signified by the unary trait -1. On the other hand, in the up-
per left quadrant, the direct opposite of it, is the impossibility of the mamma’s 
being non-existing in the universal sense and the unary trait is (-1). Finally, in 
the bottom left is +1.
Figure 1
Lacan leaves the upper right quadrant blank, and that is where he both demon-
strates the fundamental logic of exclusion and shows this logic in the classifica-
tion of mammals. Lacan takes the unary trait as -1 also for this area, for privation 
itself is showed by -1. At this point, one may wonder “on what basis it is so?” 
This question can be formulated as follows: “Could it be that there is no mam-
ma?” The answer to this question is “not possible, nothing maybe”. The second 
response, “nothing maybe”, leads us to the basis of the idea conveyed to us by 
this quadrant of the circle. Lacan states that he locates the “real” itself start-
ing from “not possible” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 7 March 1962). In other words, “not 
possible” is the origin of enunciating (Lacan, 1961–1962: 7 March 1962). Thus, 
the reply “not possible” proclaims privation in which exclusion is grounded as 
though taking as a base an impossible place. This proclamation constitutes the 
possibility of the other quadrants of the circle graph. It is, indeed, nothing but 
the statement “nothing maybe”; that is, the idea conveyed in the bottom right 
quadrant. In this quadrant, -1 points to “the logical foundation of any possibility 
of an universal affirmation” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 14 March 1962), thereby reveal-
ing the upper left quadrant of the circle graph as -(-1), universal affirmation. 
-(-1) -1
+1 -1
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A much deeper place, “the uncounted circuit”, is the base upon which -1 – 
standing separately in the upper right quadrant – establishes the aforemen-
tioned possibility. The privation here is the privation of “the uncounted circuit” 
(du tour non compté). The privation of the Real… The unary trait has appeared 
as real since “to be real” presupposes “computation, counting, to be grounded” 
(Lacan, 1961–1962: 14 March 1962). Thus, it has become clear that what lies at 
the root of the stroke the primitive hunter counts as 1 is a privation of real as not 
possible (Lacan, 1961–1961: 7 March 1962). 
* *
II. Lacan’s One-Sidedness
Tracing Exclusion
In light of the discussion to this point, I would like to draw the readers’ atten-
tion to a few issues: First, upon closer examination, Lacan bases ‘possibility’, 
which is a natural consequence of the relation of exclusion, leaving apart, and 
making an exception, upon ‘impossibility’. What makes ‘possibility’ legitimate 
is ‘impossibility’. Its enunciation as a privation is a real thing. It  – stated differ-
ently, ‘the possibility of impossibility’ – is the origin of what makes the primitive 
hunter count as 1. The counting, which is said to have started previously, starts 
from there already. That is, it starts from a place that is much prior to the count-
ing subject. If this is so, in my opinion, Lacan’s theme of ‘impossible’ could be 
further investigated and this prior counting re-examened. 
Excluded privation was possible through the enunciation of nothing. And what 
lay at the root of this enunciation was “not possible” (Lacan, 1961–1962: 7 March 
1962). Therefore, what lay at the root of all things real was ‘impossible’. How-
ever, here, one point is worth highlighting: Lacan does not regard ‘impossibil-
ity’ as the opposite of ‘possibility’ in any way whatsoever. According to him, it 
makes more sense to state it as follows: “As the opposite of the possible was the 
real, we would opt for defining the real as the impossible. I, personally, do not 
see anything that contradicts it…” (Lacan, 1998: 6 May 1964). This is a natural 
consequence of the logic of exclusion, and we can also state this as follows: All 
things that are called real are the ‘possibility of impossibility’, which is also the 
‘impossibility of possibility’.
197
on “one” (thing) that is missing in lacanian thought
What about the ‘impossibility of the impossible’4 and the ‘possibility of the pos-
sible’? If what the impossible excludes is the possible, what can be said of the 
‘impossibility of the impossible’ and the ‘possibility of the possible’ from this 
viewpoint? 
Above anything else, the following should be said about the impossibility of the 
impossible: Since this is not ‘the possibility of the impossible’, both the enun-
ciation of the possibility of nothing (i.e. the possibility of all things real) and 
the ‘impossibility of possibility’ are impossible. Nevertheless, it is right at this 
point, where ‘the impossible is impossible’, that we should start introducing the 
possible because the impossibility of the impossible is confirmed here. This pos-
sibility is not ‘the possibility of the impossible’, for what is in question is not 
the impossible but the impossibility of the impossible. What can be said about 
this possibility? This possibility cannot be impossible because, if it were so, it 
would be ‘the impossibility of the possible’; this, as mentioned above, is impos-
sible. This is a situation wherein the possible is possible. If we look at this from 
another perspective, just as Lacan considers the real from two perspectives, this 
could also be called ‘the impossibility of the impossible’.  
For the time being, let us leave out the topic of the impossible until we take it up 
again while discussing ‘the error of counting’, and let us return to counting.   
Hence, the analysis Lacan carried out regarding the case of the primary school 
pupil should be reviewed. To sum up, this analysis covers:
i) how 1 emerged; 
ii) what supports counting as 1;
iii) the investigation of what (the foundation of) 1 is.
The case of the primitive hunter is important for Lacan as it allows him to ex-
plain the essence of his reflects on this issue. However, this example could have 
well been cleared of its rich associations and stated as follows: 
I have a blank sheet in front of me, and I am looking at it, wondering how a 
‘dot’ can appear on it. I want to discover how the first dot appears just as I want 
4 The ‘impossibility of the impossible’ is not the same as ‘not impossible’. While ‘not impossi-
ble’ entails affirmative negation, the other entails negative negation. 
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to learn how the first stroke of the primitive hunter appears and how his first 
adventure is counted as 1. However, I am leaving aside the issue of counting to 
deal with it later in the paper. 
In such a situation, we have two choices regarding the appearance of the dot: 
The first choice is closely related to Lacan’s logic of ‘exclusion’ that we attempt-
ed to expound above; that is, understanding what causes the appearance of the 
dot on the paper. It seems wiser to raise this question: How is the appearance of 
the dot distinguished? What enables us to distinguish the dot from, say, the rest 
of the sheet? The fact that the dot is distinct from the page is the first thing that 
enables us to distinguish the dot. But how is it possible that the dot is distinct 
from, say, the page? The distinctiveness becomes possible by means of one dif-
ference. As in the example of the primitive hunter, what creates the dot is the 
difference. For example, this is the contrast that appears on the page as a dot. 
The dot is, so to speak, the stroke made for the difference. Lacan claims that 
just as the stroke is formed with the difference, so is the dot. What, then, can be 
said about the subsistence of the dot? According to Lacan, the stroke appears 
as the difference, the stroke co-exists with the difference that causes the stroke. 
Similarly, the dot and its difference (e.g. contrast) exist concomitantly. If we are 
to analyze this in terms of the precedence and antecedence of what appears and 
what makes it appear, we would have to say this: first the subsistence of the dif-
ference (what makes it appear), then the dot, which concomitantly appears with 
the subsistence of the difference.    
The second choice is rather related to the rationale of ‘inclusion’. What could be 
said if we consider the dot from the viewpoint of its state of having emerged and 
if we look at what may emerge rather than its agent? 
The dot, without relying on anything else, will be distinguished from the rest of 
the sheet by its emergence alone. This having been accepted, the subsistence of 
the difference – which helps distinguish and makes distinctiveness possible – 
will soon be envisaged. Therefore, soon after the dot appears as a possible posi-
tion, it will coexist with the difference. Then, if we are to evaluate the second 
choice in terms of the precedence/antecedence of what appears and what makes 
it appear, we should assert the following: first the dot concomitant of the exist-
ence of the difference, then the existence of the difference. 
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The first and the second alternatives are dissimilar. The following is a before-
and-after illustration of these two alternatives: 
  First Alternative   Second Alternative
(before)  o     (difference)   *     o     (dot and difference)
(after)  o    *     (difference and dot) o     (difference)
Figure 2
Whereas the dot, signified in Figure 2 by *, is in an exclusive relationship in the 
first alternative, it is in an inclusion relationship in the second alternative. Go-
ing back to the issue of counting will shed more light on what these alternatives 
point at. 
  
As a natural consequence of the rationale of exclusion, Lacan established ‘the 
possible’, basing it on ‘the impossible’. The same rationale applies to ‘exist-
ence’ and ‘inexistence’ (l’inexistence).  “Existence can be established by being 
based on non-existence.” It is evident enough in the illustration in the earlier 
circle graph. “Inexistence,” on which existence is based, is not “nothingness” 
(le néant), and it can be taken as a number (number 0). What is more, that is one 
of the numbers that make up the sequence of whole numbers (nombres entiers), 
and there is “no theory of whole numbers if you do not take into account what is 
involved in zero” (Lacan, 1971–1972: 19 January 1972). 
The Pascal's Triangle and the Recurrence of Inexistence
Among the justifications on this topic, the most prominent one is Frege’s “Foun-
dations of Arithmetics” (“Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik”). On the other hand, 
Lacan makes an evaluation also tracing back to Frege’s justification of whole 
numbers starting from 0. He makes very important points regarding One and 
the aforementioned counting, which we will elaborate later in the paper.  The 
following is a summary of this evaluation: 
Frege’s justification of 1 starting from 0 is significant when 1 is considered as 1. 
the signifier of inexistence. 
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Frege considers the number of objects belonging to a concept as the concept 2. 
of number that is number N. Then, the consecutive numbers form. In this 
case, if you count starting from 0 (0 1 2 3 4 5 6), what comes next is 7, but 7 
what?  This is 7 of something. This is 7 of the inexistent, the inexistent that 
lies in the foundation of repetition. 
In the3.  arithmetic triangle,       
0 1 0  0  0  0  0  0  0
0  1  1  1  1  1  1  1
0  1  2  3  4 5 6
0 1 3 6 10 15
0 1 4 10 20
0 1 5 15
0 1 6
0 1   
Figure 3
this is evident in the fact that all is enframed by 0. That there is no difference 
between 0 and 0 lays the ground for the derivation of 1. The requirement of 
distinguishing the distinction among all these 0s – that is, distinguishing 
that there is no difference between them – is absolutely necessary for the 
derivation of 1. Thus, what is recurrent is repeated as inexistence. Repetition 
is posited at first as the repetition of 1, qua the 1 of inexistence? 
There is not a single 1, but the 1 that is repeated and the 1 that is posited in 4. 
the sequence of whole numbers (Lacan, 1971–1972: 19 January 1972).
In addition, Lacan does not find Frege’s logical derivation of 1 from 0 plausible 
satisfying (Lacan, 1971–1972: 15 March 1972). Lacan implicitly states the source 
of this problem in his discussion of the lack in counting.
Now let us move on to this discussion of Lacan, which he presents independ-
ently from Frege’s reasoning, but not leaving this aside completely.
First of all, Lacan criticizes the conception of One that Plato presents in the Par-
menides dialogue (Lacan, 1971–1972: 15 March 1972). A summary of this criti-
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cism, without going into detail, goes as follows: A Platonian will prefer to call 
it ‘something of the One’ (il y a de l’Un-y a de l’un) to ‘One’. In brief, Lacan does 
not accept Plato’s ‘One’, which does not allow any ‘one thing’. That is why Lacan 
uses this term. Nevertheless, according to Lacan, when one looks at it from the 
viewpoint that Plato is unknowningly a Lacanian, if we may say so, something 
that belongs to One is one thing that dissolves from it. As it cannot be related to 
anything except the sequence of whole numbers, it is not anything but the One. 
After all, it also lies at the basis of the fallacy in Frege’s logical derivation of 1 
from 0; that is, 1 that is lacking at the level of 0. It is because of this lack of One 
that the sequence of whole numbers is revealed/formed. From 0 to 1, just as the 
lack of One yields ‘2’, ‘3’ and the others are produced because the same lacking 
continues.5
In addition to these, One, that is, One lacking, does not mean the same thing in 
all contexts. Something which starts, from One as all and that then continues 
are no longer the same; that is, these are not univocal. Bifidity of the One ex-
ists. This is an issue that is brought up in Plato’s dialogue (Lacan, 1971–1972: 15 
March 1972).   
Then, in Lacan’s discussion of One, it can be inferred that both One – that is, 
One as y a de l’un, which is issued in the logic of number and the real One, which 
is in fact based on the real One – are not the same as the One that Plato elabo-
rates in the Parmenides dialogue and that Hegel refers to in Science of Logic.  
 
This is true at least from the viewpoint of Lacan. Lacan’s One is grounded not in 
sameness but in difference. One begins at the level at which there is One lack-
ing. (Lacan, 1971–1972: 19 April 1972). It does not begin any earlier. 
What constitutes One is formulated by the lack. The 1 in the first repeated line 
of the Pascal Triangle begins from its lack: 0 (Lacan, 1971–72: 19 April 1972). That 
means counting is, as 1 of 0, the repetition of 1, the repetition of inexistence, and 
the repetition of a basic and radical lack. 
5 In fact, as can be seen later, 2 is inaccessible (Lacan 1971–1972: 10 May 1972).  
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Reconsideration of the Lack in Counting
To better understand Lacan’s line of thinking in his accounts and reasoning of 
the exclusion, a reexamination of the Pascal Triangle is needed. 
I propose the following model, which comprises 1s, for the representation of the 
Pascal's Triangle. 
Figure 4
The question at this point is this: “How is counting realized?” Here, recalling La-
can’s primitive hunter example and the example we cited through the “appear-
ance of the dot” is required. The first option as regards the appearance of the 
dot gains importance for the present discussion. The first alternative in Figure 2 
indicated that it occurred like this: 
o        (difference)
o    *     (difference and dot)
Thus, this figure could be used to represent the primitive hunter counting his 
first stroke as 1. In the light of the way Lacan presents this, in essence, we can 
see this figure in the Pascal's Triangle illustrated in Figure 4. Specifically, what 
1 counts as 1 in the first line is not itself. That takes whatever precedes as 1. This 
can be likened to the case of soldiers counting themselves during their daily 
gatherings; the first soldier in the row calls out “one”, meaning that ‘there is 
no other soldier’ in the row before him. When the first soldier calls out 1, he is 
marking the non-preceding soldier in the row with 1. Similarly, when the next 
soldier calls out “two”, he counts the soldier that comes before him in the row. 
In other words, he counts that ‘there was no soldier before the first soldier’ and 
‘the first soldier’, by means of which he does not count himself but he marks 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
       1          1
       1    1           1    1  
     1   1  1   1   =    1    2   1
    1   1 1  11  1 1  1    1    3    3  1
                   1   4    6   4  1
          ...                ...
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those that precede. As a matter of fact, the first soldier’s ‘one’ comes out at the 
point where the soldier distinguishes himself from the soldier before him. He 
calls this differentiation 1. The soldier counts as 1 what he perceives as ‘non-
existing’ before himself. He does not count himself – not yet! His differentiation 
will be done by the next soldier after himself.  Accordingly, he will be counted 
later. The nature of counting as to such deferment is further explained in the 
illustration of the Pascal's Triangle below. 
Figure 5
The innermost box counts the one before it as 1. The next box puts the mark 1 for 
the innermost box before it, and another 1 is transferred from the box that it has 
counted. That is, it has counted 1 1. The following box marks the next box with 
1, and it puts 1 1 for the boxes it has counted.  As 1 transfers from the innermost 
box that is in front of it, it counts 1 1 1 1. The next box puts 1 for the next box in 
front of it, and puts 1 1 1 1 for those it has counted. It puts 11 for those counted 
by the next box in front of this one, and because the innermost box in front of 
it transfers 1, the final count is as such; 1  1111  11 1.  This goes on like this recur-
sively. We can depict it for all levels:
φ),,φ,1),,φ,1)1,1),,φ,1)1,1)1,1,1,1),,φ,1)1,1)1,1,1,1)1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1  
φ : symbolizes the one that is ahead at the start. 
1
1       1
1     1  1     1
1     1 1 1 1 1 1     1
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The essence of the counting that takes place here could also be described by 
this analogy: What is called ‘counting’ is constructing storeys in a building. In 
the Pascal's Triangle, this starts with making the mark 1 that stands at the front. 
The next one marks, or repeats, whatever it sees before it. The second line is an 
entire repetition of the first line for it and the one that is in front of it. The third 
line, or the third storey, marks those that come before it as they are. That is, it 
marks the second line, the first line, and the one in front of it. This goes on in 
this fashion. The mark at the beginning is basically different from the one that 
stands before (the lack resulting from the fact that the mark did not exist be-
fore), so counting is delayed, and it takes place in the repetition. The first storey 
is counted only after the second storey.  
Let us examine this according to the first alternative presented in Figure 2.
In this figure, parallel to Lacan’s explanation, we take the terms as o: 0 and *: 1. 
When we take the difference as 0 and the dot as 1 – the appearance of 1 in this 
situation is as follows: 
0       
0       1    
Because 1 is realized owing to the difference and because the difference is not 
eliminated when 1 is produced, according to this figure, with the next 1 the fol-
lowing is produced:       
0
0       1.   
Accordingly, it appears at the other 1 as      
      
0
0       1
0       1.   As the appearance of each 1 is based on the difference, it continues like 
this:
 0             
 0       1        
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 0       1        
 0       1    
 0       1
 ...
Since the appearance of 1 is as 0 0 1 in this continuing sequence, each 0 is con-
nected with the 0 1 below because 0 1 is formed as 0 1 on the grounds of that 0. 
At this point, the Pascal's Triangle and whole numbers form as follows:
The appearance of the first 1 is the first 1 in the Pascal's Triangle. Let us jot down 
every new 1 below. Then, the following picture will emerge: 
1
1
However, the first 1 has already been derived, so it should have been shown next 
to the 1 at the bottom. That is, we should have shown or counted the 1s up to that 
particular 1. As a result, the picture for now is as follows: 1
  1       1       When we jot down the 1 which then emerges, this will 
produce      1
       1       1
       1      
However, to show the 1s that have been derived up to the emergence of this 1, 
we have to jot down the previous ones next to it. The present picture, then, is as 
follows: 
  1
  1       1
  1       1       1       1. 
A sequence which goes on like this (0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1…) produces the sequence 
resulting in the Pascal's Triangle and whole numbers. Obviously, every new 
number is like constructing a new storey. This takes places in the appearance of 
every new 1. In addition, the lack of 1 on the level of the first 0 delays the count-
ing process exactly by One. And, in fact, there is no 2, which has been derived 
by means of 0 and 1. The generation of numbers is exponential, as in adding 
storeys. Number 2 is inaccessible.
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A Closer Focus
Lacan claims that the 1 in question here was derived from the lack indicated by 0 
(Lacan, 1971–1972: 10 May 1972). That was the lack of One. What produced 1 was 
the lack of One at the level of 0.       
It can be claimed that this is the reality of One from one aspect only and it finds 
its real meaning in Lacan’s statement regarding “the inaccessibility of 2”. In the 
following part I will attempt to elaborate the other aspect of this reality detailed 
above. 
Once again, let us first have a look at the first alternative of Figure 2, or the figure 
that involves repetition in counting.  Now a greater focus on the delay in the 
genesis of 1 in this figure is required.
The figure showed the genesis of 1 as follows:
 0
 0       1.       When exactly is 1 counted? The fact that 1 appears because 
of the lack of One at the level of 0 delays it by One on the level of 0. Because, at 
the level of 0, 1 will always be missing by One, 2 (Two) is inaccessible. However, 
when do we start to count the delay? This is how 1 and the difference – which 
concomitantly exist – are delayed according to the lack at the level of 0; that is, 
One is lacking. This could have been expressed as follows: the delay of 1 after 
the difference that exists at the same time according to the lack at the level of 0. 
Each situation can be illustrated as follows: 
Figure 6
The lack of One also determines/establishes what distinguishes 1 from 0. Hav-
ing mentioned this difference, let us show this difference on the right-hand side 
of Figure 6. The illustration on the left is more of an illustration pointing to the 
fact that the lack is radical. The illustration on the right, however, depicts that 
0
----------------
0       1
0
----------------
0  ----  1
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the lack propagates itself in the form of difference. Furthermore, both the radi-
cal lack and the (radical) difference that play a role in the genesis of 1 are seen 
here. The radical lack is the lack of One at the same time. And the difference is 
both the difference of 1 and the difference of the lack. More specifically, it both is 
derived as 1 and does not disappear as the difference because the lack is radical, 
and the separateness between both differences is due to difference being radi-
cal. Then, let us show the difference with #, but because it is repeated, let us put 
another #. And let us represent the lack being radical, the without-One state, 
with the void in between. Then, the new representation is like this:      
 
  #       #     
This representation also means the inaccessibility of Two. 
* * *
III. Toward the Conclusion
The Rationale of Inclusion and One
Let us now return to the dot example and focus on the second alternative in Fig-
ure 2. We will consider the possible consequences of the second alternative. To 
this end, we will review what consequences we drew from the first alternative: 
1) Counting is always delayed; thus, it is a post-process (a posteriori);
2) The delay is owing to the lack of One; 
3) A radical lack is prior to what is counted as 1; 
4) Therefore, the thing that is counted in this alternative is at the ‘utmost’ front; 
it is φ=0, or without One, the radical lack; 
5) ‘The possibility of the impossible’ is where this alternative finds its basis; 
6) This is described within the rationale of exclusion. 
A reconsideration of the other alternative in the light of this summary obliges us 
to pose this question: Where is the place of counting in this alternative? The re-
lated figure will be retrieved within this discussion. The figure was as follows:
*           o     
       o
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The only thing that seems related to counting can be shown by the symbol ‘o’.
In the first alternative it is this difference that is subject to counting. Now, let 
us return to the first alternative before we dwell further on this difference that 
could be subject to counting in the second alternative.
 
In the first alternative, we counted 1 for what is in the front, that is, for φ=0, or we 
rather used 0 1 for φ=0. φ=0 stands for a one-less situation where dot (*) in the 
first alternative does not exist, or where it falls later as 1. Focusing on the situa-
tion itself, can we call one-less, as φ=0, the difference in the second alternative? 
As is clear in the discussion above, if the difference in the second alternative is 
made subject to counting, this difference is either φ=0 or it is before or after. The 
after (a posteriori) situation has been elaborated well enough in the light of the 
Lacanian elabortion. This brings us to an analysis of the remaining two situa-
tions.
First of all, let us examine the case where the difference is in front of φ=0. If we 
assume that the difference is φφ=0 and start counting, this will yield φφ=0, φ=0, 
and 0 1. However, because of the counting of φφ, we have to read 0 1 as 1. The 
reason for this is that, as we found out earlier, counting continues as in 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1... However, because of φ=0, 0 1 should remain 0 1. Then, in the event that 
φφ=0 is in the front, we should consider the two-term counts such as 0 1 as One 
because 0 1 is both 0 1 and 1. Put differently, in this situation, #   # will be # due to 
φφ=0. This points toward One and the genesis of One. However, it is One which 
generates, pointing to the prior rather than the posterior.
The #  #, which we arrived at by counting minus 1, is the counting forward of 
the difference. The counting of the difference backward, on the other hand, is #. 
Considering also the second alternative, counting backward indicates ‘before’ 
as ‘the impossibility of the impossible’ or ‘the possiblity of the possible’ in the 
example with the dot. 
It is time we examined the second alternative, or the situation where the differ-
ence in the second alternative is the same as φ=0; the notations so far are #, as 
the indicator of One, and separate from this, # #, as the indicator of Two. This 
is the case where φφ=0 is equal to φ=0. Sameness can be demonstrated in two 
ways: Either via φφ=0 or φ=0. When it is demonstrated through φφ=0, as regards 
the second alternative of the case with the dot, a backward counting of the dif-
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ference is specified. When it is demonstrated through φ=0, on the other hand, as 
regards the first alternative of the dot example, a process of counting forward of 
the difference is specified. However, in both situations the specification of the 
sameness is achieved through some kind of strife because the ‘difference’ brings 
about counting. Nevertheless, because of the counting which is caused by the 
‘difference’, the flux of the sequence 0 0 1 0 1 0 1… will go on.  
Consequently, if we re-examine all three situations that result from the compari-
son of the first and second alternatives as to the dot, we have to use the follow-
ing notations: the situation of a posteriori counting of the difference (#  #); and 
the situation of counting backward the difference (#). If the first and the second 
alternatives are expressed together, we have to resort to # and # #. Because the 
next representation will involve a depiction of the permanent difference and the 
Sameness together, it will be in either of the ways shown below.
                                             #                    or                   #          # 
                                      #            #                                         #
(Specification of sameness as to the second alternative)/(Specification of sameness as to 
the first alternative). 
In other words, thus, we can call it the permanent difference together with the 
specification of before and after.  
Interpreting the Symbol # and the Final Word
Now we have the following separate options as regards the representation with 
#.
  #
#    ,    #    # ,    #       #    or    #    #    
                                                      #
Then how should we read these options and #? First of all, separate from each 
other as these options are, the last representation (  #
      #       #   or    #      #    
                  # )
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is rather a representation that deals with the relation of One with Two. This is 
twofold: from One to Two and from Two to One. The previous representation (# 
#) is geared toward Two, and the one before that (#) is geared toward One.
While the representation that complies with Lacanian thought is #  #, in He-
gel’s               
       #             and
#           #       #           #                                   
              #              are together. 
        #
That is,  #           # 
          #.  The representation # can be said to have a position that can make 
thinking prior. The reason for this is that, considering the different states of the 
condition above, the display of ‘one-ness’ and ‘differences’ can only be achieved 
based only on the symbol #. In addition, this representation is conducive to 
different ways of thinking. For example, in the case with the dot, according to 
       #          
    #     #   and
#    #
   #,  where the first and the second alternatives are considered together, we can 
consicder the Pascal's Triangle under the representation of #    #
               #; there should 
be another triangle that is prior to the Pascal's Triangle according to the other 
side of this representation; that is,    
   #       
#    #. 
And that is a reversed triangle. Though it may be difficult to imagine, the rep-
resentation predicts this. It should be so according to a counting that includes 
φφ=0. It is a flow moving in the reverse direction. And it is only one of the many 
things than can be claimed based on this representation.
As can be clearly understood from the representation of #, the Lacanian doc-
trine of One is a one-sided doctrine which perceives One without One. It can be 
said that the other side of the reality regarding it is ‘completed’ when the other 
alternatives showed by # are considered. It is also worth noting that this is ex-
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actly how disintegration in language and thought and ‘one’ness can be looked 
at from a higher perspective thanks to an opportunity provided by #. 
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